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Background: Although adaptation and proper biological functioning require developmental programming,
pollutant interference can cause developmental toxicity or DT.
Objectives: This commentary assesses whether it is ethical for citizens/physicians/scientists to allow avoidable DT.
Methods: Using conceptual, economic, ethical, and logical analysis, the commentary assesses what major ethical
theories and objectors would say regarding the defensibility of allowing avoidable DT.
Results: The commentary argues that (1) none of the four major ethical theories (based, respectively, on virtue,
natural law, utility, or equity) can consistently defend avoidable DT because it unjustifiably harms, respectively,
individual human flourishing, human life, the greatest good, and equality. (2) Justice also requires leaving “as much
and as good” biological resources for all, including future generations possibly harmed if epigenetic change is
heritable. (3) Scientists/physicians have greater justice-based duties, than ordinary/average citizens, to help stop DT
because they help cause it and have greater professional abilities/opportunities to help stop it. (4) Scientists/
physicians likewise have greater justice-based duties, than ordinary/average citizens, to help stop DT because they
benefit more from it, given their relatively greater education/consumption/income. The paper shows that major
objections to (3)-(4) fail on logical, ethical, or scientific grounds, then closes with practical suggestions for
implementing its proposals.
Conclusions: Because allowing avoidable DT is ethically indefensible, citizens—and especially physicians/
scientists—have justice-based duties to help stop DT.
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In Spring 2012, organizers of PPTOX III—a conference
focused on integrating "the role of environmental expo-
sures and nutrients during development on subsequent
diseases/dysfunctions later in life"— issued a white
paper. So far, nearly 100 physicians/scientists throughout
the world have co-signed it. Reviewing classic scientific
research on how developmental exposures to environ-
mental chemicals can cause later disease/dysfunction,
the white paper draws two main conclusions. One is that
children’s in-utero and early-postnatal-developmental
periods are “particularly sensitive to developmental dis-
ruption by nutritional factors or environmental-chemicalCorrespondence: kshrader@nd.edu
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumexposures, with potentially adverse consequences for
health later in life.” A second conclusion is that chil-
dren’s heightened developmental sensitivity requires a
new “policy and public health response” of “both re-
search and disease-prevention strategies” [1].Developmental toxicity (DT)
While the white paper provides the scientific basis for
special child-developmental protection against environ-
mental chemicals, this paper provides a preliminary
ethical basis for protection. It argues that, to varying
degrees and for slightly different reasons, citizens, phy-
sicians, and scientists each have justice-based, some-
times overlapping, duties to help stop developmental
toxicity or DT.
DT refers to the fact that “many of the major diseases—
and dysfunctions—that have increased substantially inntral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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to developmental factors associated with. . .exposures to
environmental chemicals” [1]. Scientists confirm that, des-
pite the need for much more research to reduce various
scientific uncertainties, the concept of the “developmental
origins of [much] health and disease. . .is sufficiently
robust and repeatable across species, including humans”
[1], that toxin-induced “epigenetic modifications can be
passed from one cell generation to the next and, in
some cases, when germ cells are targeted, can be trans-
generationally transmitted” [2]. These adverse effects,
however, “may not be apparent during a latent period
which may last from months to years or decades,” and
they can result from “a combination of developmental
stressors. . .[that] cause effects jointly with similar or
other exposures.” These harms—manifested as “increased
incidence,. . .earlier onset, or an increased severity” of
disease or dysfunction—include “obesity, diabetes, hyper-
tension, cardiovascular disease, asthma and allergy, im-
mune and autoimmune diseases, neurodevelopmental
and neurodegenerative diseases, precocious puberty, in-
fertility, some cancer types, osteoporosis, depression,
schizophrenia, and sarcopenia” [1].
Although all environmental exposures likely causing
DT have not been fully confirmed, low-dose environ-
mental chemicals known to cause DT include “especially
endocrine disrupting chemicals” or EDCs. “Examples of
EDCs known to alter disease susceptibility as a result of
developmental exposures in animal models include
bisphenol A (from polycarbonate plastics), phthalates
(a softener in plastics), some organophosphate and or-
ganochlorine pesticides, nicotine (tobacco smoking), air
pollution, perfluorooctane compounds (stain and water
repellents), and polybrominated diphenyl ethers (flame
retardants) – all chemicals that are found in detectable
concentrations in blood or urine samples from most
people” [1].
Using a thought experiment to help decide how to
respond to DT
The preceding list of developmental toxins, however, is
not complete. Also, because much DT testing remains
to be done, some scientists are uncertain about DT and
its potential epigenetic effects. How should scientists/
society respond, given such unknowns?
When it is impossible or impractical for scientists to
rapidly conduct real-world experiments on some ques-
tion, they often use thought experiments—apriori, rather
than empirical, assessments using only reason and
imagination. Richard Feynman famously described
thought experiments as more elegant than physical ones.
Galileo’s “tower” thought experiment showed that, con-
trary to Aristotle, objects of different masses fall at the
same acceleration. Maxwell’s “demon” showed that,contrary to the second law of thermodynamics, entropy
could be decreased. Einstein used Schrödinger's “cat” to
show that, contrary to Copenhagen interpretations of
quantum mechanics, observation does not break
quantum-state superposition.
Ethicists also use thought experiments. Judith Thomson’s
“transplant surgeon” showed that, contrary to some utili-
tarians, one cannot deliberately kill an innocent person to
save more lives. Philippa Foot’s “trolley” showed that, con-
trary to some egalitarians, one could allow one death in
order to save more people, provided the victim was not
used as a means to this end.
Would a thought experiment also help clarify how scien-
tists/society ought to respond to DT—to environmental-
chemical exposures that may put children at risk of later
disease and dysfunction? To answer this question, consider
a thought experiment about another potential harm to
children.
Suppose you are on vacation in Brazil, taking an early-
morning walk. Crying, a tiny boy’s well-dressed “aunt”
approaches you, saying she is late for work. She apolo-
gizes for bothering you, is clearly distraught, and says
she fears losing her job because of her lateness, unless
someone takes her visiting “nephew” to his mother. The
“aunt” pleads for help, gives you the child and his “ad-
dress,” then offers you money for taking him “home.”
Should you help the “aunt,” take the child to the address,
but refuse the money? Or should you take the child to
the police?
On one hand, the Brazilian “aunt” may be telling the
truth and may need a Good Samaritan. On the other
hand, the child may be at risk of organ trafficking. Given
the shortage of available organs for transplant, and the
millions of “street children” in nations like Brazil, the
World Health Organization estimates that organ traffick-
ing accounts for up to 10 percent of all organ trans-
plants. Part of a trillion-dollar annual global-economic
output in illicit trade, organ trafficking annually causes
thousands of murders among many of those whose
organs are harvested for resale [3,4].
What you ought to do about the Brazilian child may il-
luminate what scientists/society ought to do about DT.
After all, although organ transplants and industrial/agri-
cultural chemicals serve important goods, both pose at
least 7 serious—and similar–risks. Both involve potential
harm, uncertainty, innocent victims, lack of child consent,
and high stakes—only “one chance” to possibly avoid
organ-harvester murderers or to “develop a brain” [5].
Both also involve questions such as whether to minimize
false-negative risks (to children) or false-positive risks (to
the aunt/chemical-industry), and whether to make health-
economics tradeoffs.
Most informed people probably would find it easier to
decide what to do in the Brazilian-child case than in the
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They likely would not give an innocent child to possible
traffickers. Yet this commentary argues that—according to
all major ethical theories—the answer regarding whether
citizens/physicians/scientists should allow avoidable DT is
almost as clear as whether to deliver the Brazilian child to
his “home.” In both cases, justice and the vulnerability of
children argue for their protection.
Scientific uncertainty about organ trafficking and DT
Why does it seem more difficult to decide the DT, than
the Brazilian-child question? One reason, already noted, is
that the relevant science is still unfolding. A second reason
is that organ trafficking involves threats to specific indivi-
duals, while scientists typically can document subtle DT
harm mainly to populations, although individuals are
affected. Third, human studies reveal organ trafficking,
whereas mainly animal studies reveal DT. Fourth, organ
trafficking is more obvious to laypeople than is DT. Fifth,
because of this obviousness, citizens might claim that in
the organ-trafficking case, it is better to risk false positives
(false assertions of child harm) than false negatives,
whereas in the DT case, scientists might claim it is better
to risk false negatives (false assertions of no DT harm to
children), than false positives, because scientists typically
have more aversion to false positives [6,7]. Sixth, although
organ traffickers obviously have no rights to economic
gain from their activities, industries (that seriously harm
no one) do have such rights. If these industries are un-
justly accused, they could face economic harm from DT
regulation, but if possible DT victims are not protected, in-
nocent, non-consenting children (and future generations,
if epigenetic change is heritable) could face health harm—
a possible stealth DT pandemic. Yet, given global reces-
sion and government-research-funding cutbacks, argu-
ments for increasing DT funding, so as to reduce all these
DT-associated uncertainties, face an uphill battle. The
result?
Needed DT-related science is not getting done, and
many uncertainties about DT remain. This is partly be-
cause of the “Matthew Effect” [8], that most scientific
studies—of substances on the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s (EPA’s) risk-based-priority ranking of high-
production-volume (HPV) chemicals—focus on the top
10–20 chemicals. Already-overstudied chemicals are
studied more, whereas risky chemicals, ranked 50th or
90th among roughly 80,000, are rarely studied [8]. A sec-
ond cause of DT uncertainty is that only 7 percent of
HPV chemicals have ever been assessed for developmen-
tal effects or toxicity to children [9]. Third, under the in-
nocent-until-proved-guilty assumption, at least 1000
new chemicals enter the market annually, giving scien-
tists little time to study them before they may cause ser-
ious harm [10].A fourth reason for uncertainty about DT is scientists’
disagreement over causal inferences. British statistician
Austin Bradford Hill [11] introduced 9 causal-inference
guidelines: strength of the mathematical association, bio-
logical plausibility (underlying mechanisms), coherence,
consistency with other results, specificity of results (one-
to-one relationships), temporality (causes’ preceding
effects), biological gradients (dose–response curves),
experimental evidence, and analogies with causal
precedents.
So-called “black-box epidemiologists” (the majority
camp) emphasize Hill’s first guideline and use math-
ematical/statistical measures like relative risk to assess
cause-effect relationships, whereas so-called “eco-
epidemiologists” (the minority camp) are methodological
pluralists who emphasize the second guideline and often
seek cause-effect mechanisms. Although black-box epi-
demiologists emphasize statistical evidence, even for
purely-observational data, are more eager to avoid
false positives, and focus on disease treatment—eco-
epidemiologists avoid using only statistical tests of
observational data, are more eager to false negatives,
and focus more on disease prevention. Unsurpris-
ingly, these camps often disagree about harm from
specific chemical exposures [12].
First of four arguments: Dominant ethical theories
disallow DT
Despite some disananogies between organ trafficking
and DT exposure, and despite some scientific uncertain-
ties about DT, the ethics is reasonably clear. Any one of
at least four different ethical arguments, given in
subsequent pages, is alone sufficient to show that it is
prima-facie unethical to allow avoidable DT. (To call
something prima-facie unethical means (i) that a general
ethical principle affirms it is unethical; (ii) that the bur-
den of proof is on anyone wishing to justify a case-
specific override of this prima-facie principle; and (iii)
that anyone who disagrees (with a case-specific appli-
cation of the principle) must provide precise, compel-
ling, ultima-facie (all-things-considered) arguments to
the contrary [13,14]. Such ultima-facie arguments might
be, for instance, that allowing DT, given a specific chem-
ical compound/case/ time/set of circumstances, would
cause less human death/disease/dysfunction than not
allowing it).
Why do the four arguments (given in subsequent
pages) establish merely prima-facie principles against
allowing DT? Because ethical principles must be applic-
able to a wide variety of situations, by definition they do
not take into account the millions of case-specific or
conflict-specific factual and moral considerations—
ultima-facie considerations—that might override them
and cause exceptions. Instead, moral principles establish
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on violators.
The four different ethical arguments, each sufficient
to show that allowing avoidable DT is prima-facie un-
ethical—focus, respectively, on (1) ethical theory, (2)
just political theory, (3) DT causality, and (4) DT bene-
fits. (1) The ethical-theory argument has four parts and
argues that no major ethics codes (Aristotelian, Thom-
istic, utilitarian, egalitarian) allow avoidable DT because,
even if epigenetic change is not heritable, DT unjustifi-
ably harms individual human flourishing, life, equality,
and good. (2) The just-political-theory argument is that
no major political codes allow unequal “takings” from
the biological commons, as would occur if DT-induced
epigenetic change is heritable. (3) The DT-causality ar-
gument is that—even if epigenetic change is not herit-
able—all citizens, and scientists/physicians in particular,
have justice-based duties to take action on avoidable
DT because they helped cause it. (4) The DT-benefits
argument is that—even if epigenetic change is not her-
itable—all citizens, and scientists/physicians in particu-
lar, have justice-based duties to take action on
avoidable DT because they benefit from it. After pre-
senting these four basic arguments, the paper shows
that all major objections to them are logically/ethically/
scientifically flawed.
To assess argument (1) above, consider four main eth-
ical codes—classical Aristotelian virtue theory, medieval
Thomistic natural-law theory, modern/contemporary
Millian utilitarianism, and modern/contemporary Raw-
lsian egalitarianism. A very quick, simple survey reveals
that all these ethical theories would mandate that allow-
ing avoidable DT is prima-facie indefensible.Aristotelian ethics
For Aristotelians, the purpose, meaning, goal, or telos
of life is human flourishing or eudaimonia, the desired
end of all human actions. For Aristotelians, humans
achieve this end or telos of flourishing by having a vir-
tuous character. And they attain a virtuous character
through practicing the virtues—such as justice and
courage. Because DT threatens the fundamental telos
or end of human flourishing or eudaimonia—given its
increasing disease susceptibility, adverse neurological/
other effects, epigenomic disruption, and possible trans-
generational effects [2,15–18]—consistent Aristotelians
would not allow DT. Moreover, in the Aristotelian
world, where the virtue of courage is a key means to
flourishing or eudaimonia, those who lack the courage
to protect others, such as innocent children, will them-
selves not attain eudaimonia. Therefore those lacking
courage behave unethically, apart from the indefensible
harm they allow to children.Suppose someone objected that allowing DT-inducing
environmental toxins promoted overall economic
welfare, therefore human flourishing? Consistent Aristo-
telians would reject this objection because they believe
money is merely a medium of exchange, something able
to corrupt people and natural exchanges, hence some-
thing unable to capture fundamentally incommensurable
and superior values—like human flourishing. Aristote-
lians believe the fundamental ethical end, telos, or eudai-
monia is not captured through cost-benefit calculations.
Therefore, to show that allowing DT is ethical, for
Aristotelians, would require showing that DT promoted
greater virtue and eudaimonia or flourishing. Yet there
is no reason to believe that allowing DT would lead to
greater virtue and flourishing, given the harms it
causes [19].
Natural-law ethics and alleged “free-market” objections
A second major class of ethical theorists, consistent fol-
lowers of Thomas Aquinas’ natural-law ethics, likewise
must reject avoidable DT. For them, universal law—written
on human hearts, discoverable by human reason—binds
people/government to act in accord with it, especially its
fundamental tenet to preserve human life and authentic
happiness [20]. Because DT threatens life and happiness—
just as it threatens Aristotelian flourishing—natural-law
theorists cannot allow avoidable DT.
Of course, anti-regulatory political theorists—like at-
torney Cass Sunstein, current (2012) administrator of
the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
whose research has been funded by right-wing think
tanks, like the American Enterprise Institute—reject this
ethics. He and other alleged “free-market” environmen-
talists would likely claim that allowing DT contributes to
preserving human life. Sunstein’s argues that (1) monies
spent on regulations “produce less employment and
more poverty,” (2) “wealth buys longevity,” and therefore
health-related regulations cost money, “increase risk,”
thus kill people [21].
However, Sunstein’s alleged-free-market objection to
stopping DT in invalid because it commits three logical
fallacies of false cause in premises (1–2) above. The first
fallacy consists of assuming in premise (1) that regula-
tions reduce employment. Yet health-related regulations
are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for
reduced overall employment. Instead, health-related reg-
ulations typically increase overall employment or shift it
from one sector/industry to another, with no net job
loss. For instance, workers often move from old/dirty to
new/clean technologies, with no overall job loss, partly
because many clean technologies such as solar/wind are
more labor intensive, per kilowatt of electricity pro-
duced. Cleaner technologies also often save lives and
therefore jobs [22,23].
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is the assumption that industrial profits are always spent
to increase employment, an assumption falsified by the
last half-century of US economic history. A third false-
cause fallacy occurs in premise (2), that “wealth buys
longevity.” On the contrary, research shows mortality is
very strongly associated with societal income-inequality,
not with either per-capita or median income [24].
These three false-cause fallacies arise partly because
alleged “free-market” environmentalists ignore relevant
facts/norms, such as that higher employment has little
value for people increasingly made ill by DT, or that
higher employment does not excuse injustice to inno-
cent children. It did, one could justify employing many
people as “pushers” to children. This supposed free-
market argument likewise is invalid for a fourth reason:
It begs the question that cost-benefit analysis is the sole
test for regulations. A simple counter example shows it
is not: Law requires expensive trials and possible pros-
ecution/incarceration/death for accused murderers. Yet,
criminologists agree these requirements are rarely cost-
effective because most murders are not serial offenders,
hence pose no future threat to society. Instead, society
tries them because justice requires it. If so, justice
trumps cost-effectiveness and therefore alleged “free-
market” environmentalism.
Apart from its four logical fallacies, the alleged “free
market” objection to avoiding/preventing DT also fails
scientifically. Why? Adam Smith and virtually all econo-
mists and ethicists agree that economically-efficient (and
ethical) market transactions require full information and
fully voluntary exchanges. Without them, Coase’s fam-
ous theorem is inapplicable. (Coase’s theorem—a key
basis for economic analysis of government regulation—is
that, regardless of how property rights are initially
apportioned, if there are no transaction costs, and if
people can trade in an externality, then bargaining will
lead to an economically-efficient outcome.) Yet obvi-
ously consumer-market behavior regarding pollutants is
neither fully informed nor fully voluntary, partly because
polluters often mislead about harm, fight labeling and
right-to-know requirements, and resist government/
consumer information-gathering [25–28]. If so, sup-
posed “free-market” proponents apply their views to
precisely the cases (DT cases without fully informed,
voluntary exchanges) that, economists agree, generate
no economically-efficient outcomes. Indeed, poor or
poorly educated consumers often have neither equal bar-
gaining power nor ability to correct disinformation and
skewed market forces. If not, misapplied free-market
objections really offer a wolf ’s argument in sheep’s cloth-
ing. The sheep is market reasoning; the wolf is “might
makes right,” defending conclusions that allow harm to
poor/innocent people on false grounds that harming themincreases overall wealth/employment. Given alleged “free-
market” environmentalism’s scientific/ethical flaws, it is
unsurprising that consistent free-market economists reject
claims that regulations kill people [29]. Thus, supposed
“free-market” objections to avoiding/preventing DTare in-
valid. They fail on logical, scientific, and ethical grounds.
Utilitarian ethics
A third major group of ethicists, modern/contemporary
utilitarians, maintains ethical actions are those that
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of
people, as measured by preferences. They likewise can-
not consistently defend allowing avoidable DT because
DT death/disease, and people’s uncertainty/anxiety
regarding whether their loved ones will be DT victims,
both harm the greater good. Why? Harms to minorities,
like children, hurt the majority. This why utilitarian
John Stuart Mill [30] rejected “the tyranny of the
majority.”
However, an objector might claim that societal inequi-
ties from DT do not reduce overall welfare because
health-related regulations cause unemployment, thus kill
people. Yet, as the previous criticisms of objections to
natural-law arguments for avoiding/preventing DT re-
veal, the alleged “free-market” objection fails to justify
allowing avoidable DT because its premises are factually
false, and its inferences are invalid.
Egalitarian ethics
A fourth main group of ethicists, modern/contemporary
egalitarians, likewise would reject avoidable DT. Egalitar-
ians, like the late Harvard ethicist John Rawls [31], say
that because equal opportunity and liberty are primary
ethical goals, unavoidable societal inequalities should be
arranged so as to benefit the least-well-off, the most vul-
nerable. Consequently they would reject avoidable DT
because it thwarts liberty and equal opportunity, espe-
cially among least-well-off victims, like children.
Nevertheless, objectors might counter egalitarianism
by appeal to the alleged “free-market” objection, already
considered/rejected. Yet the free-market objection relies
on rejecting equal opportunity for the sake of alleged
economic benefits. Rawls, however, argues no one would
sanction equal-opportunity violations unless she were
certain not to be a victim, a fact demonstrating the self-
interested bias—and invalid arguments—of those who
reject egalitarian ethics.
As the preceding considerations reveal, all main ethical
theories (based on virtue, equality, overall preferences, and
equality) reject allowing avoidable DT, but on different
grounds and with different degrees of stringency. Aristotel-
ian virtue ethicists, Thomistic natural-law theorists, and
Rawlsian egalitarians would all reject avoidable DT because
of its harms to basic goods, respectively, flourishing, life,
Shrader-Frechette Environmental Health 2012, 11:61 Page 6 of 13
http://www.ehjournal.net/content/11/1/61and equality. Millian utilitarians are a bit less stringent
(in disallowing avoidable DT) than are ethicists in the
other three groups, because utilitarians in principle allow
money/harm tradeoffs. However, even utilitarians would
find it nearly impossible to show that most people’s pre-
ferences would trade DT harm to their children for
money.
Second argument: Major political theories disallow DT
Besides all four major ethical theories, dominant political
theories—if they are consistent—must disallow avoidable
DT. Whether socialist, Marxist, libertarian, capitalist, or
anarchist, virtually all political theorists accept John
Locke’s account of property rights and his labor theory
of value. That is, they all maintain human labor/merit/
effort creates property rights in things, and that one can-
not have full property rights over anything one’s labor
has not created—although different groups may disagree
over what constitutes labor/merit/effort, and how far
property rights extend. Because human labor did not
create common natural/biological resources (such as
land and genes), full property right to them are impos-
sible and, instead, Lockeans argue one can use natural/
biological resources only under the constraint of an
equal-opportunity criterion—provided “as much and as
good” is left for all other people, including future gen-
erations. While political theorists may disagree over pre-
cisely what is “as much and as good” for future people,
they all agree with this Lockean account of property
rights and its equal-opportunity criterion for natural/
biological resources [32]. Otherwise, despots could il-
legitimately claim full rights to resources needed for
others’ survival. Because avoidable DT harms resources
(like genomic stability)—possibly for future generations,
if epigenetic changes are heritable—avoidable DT harms
are never permissible. One never has rights to “take”
that over which (like biological resources) one has no
property rights.
But doesn’t society recognize civil property rights/
patents over natural resources like land and genes?
While social/civil convention accepts such legal rights as
a matter of convenience, even conservative ethical/legal
theorists (including William Blackstone) agree that no
rational grounds (only grounds of “might makes right”)
exist for claiming property rights over things not created
by labor. Instead, they admit property “rights” to bio-
logical resources often originated from fraud, violence,
theft, bullying, or colonialism—then were “transferred”
through the ages. Thus, virtually all “transfers” have been
problematic because original “owners” often had the
equivalent of stolen goods, violating Locke’s as-much-
and-as-good proviso. If so, many current conventional
property rights (to biological-commons resources) are as
ethically indefensible as conventions of racism, sexism,or homophobia. But if property rights to natural bio-
logical resources—such as genomic stability/health—are
impossible, and if those who threaten genetic integrity
(because of the heritability of epigenetic change) there-
fore have no rights to do so, then avoidable DT is ethic-
ally impermissible [33], and citizens/scientists should
not allow it.
Third argument: Helping cause DT creates greater DT
duties
Apart from ethical theory, justice-based reasons also
show that citizens, and especially physicians/scientists,
should not allow avoidable DT. The DT-causality argu-
ment is that—even if epigenetic change is not herit-
able—all citizens, and scientists/physicians in particular,
have justice-based duties to take action on avoidable DT
because they helped cause this harm to children. How
so? Virtually everyone contributes to air pollution, and
virtually everyone uses/purchases products containing
bisphenol A, phthalates, organophosphate and organo-
chlorine pesticides, nicotine, perfluorooctane compounds,
and polybrominated diphenyl ethers–-all chemicals
known to cause DT [1]. Because everyone contributes to
DT through pollution and product use, everyone has du-
ties to help stop this harm they cause. The ethics is basic:
if you broke it, you should fix it.
Moreover, because democracy is not a spectator sport,
and because all citizens in a democracy are responsible
for being politically active, so as to help stop public
harms, all citizens have duties to help stop avoidable
DT. Those who have never even attempted to help stop
avoidable DT have special duties to do so, precisely be-
cause they bear a greater responsibility for helping cause
DT because of their inaction and their failure to exercise
the duties of citizenship. Thus, although everyone who
helps cause DT has prima facie duties to help stop it,
those duties differ, ultima facie and individual to individ-
ual, as a function of factors such as one’s fractional
contribution to DT, one’s knowledge, profession, time,
expertise, etc. [34].
Scientists’/physicians’ greater abilities generate greater
duties
Although scientists/physicians share duties with other
citizens to help stop DT because of helping cause it, they
have special duties, all other things being equal, because
they have greater ability/expertise/intellectual-professional
resources (than laypeople) to help stop DT. As all pro-
fessional ethics codes note, all other things being equal,
greater ability to prevent some harm generates greater
responsibilities to do so [35]. The American Medical
Association, for instance, says that because of their
“skills and competency,” physicians should “educate the
public and policy about present and future threats to
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nomic, educational, and political changes that amelior-
ate suffering and contribute to human well-being” [36].
Scientists’ physicians’ unearned advantages generate
greater duties
All citizens have duties to help alleviate avoidable DT
not merely proportional to their skills and abilities, but
also proportional to their unearned advantages from so-
ciety. All other things being equal, the greater a citizen’s
wealth, intelligence, freedom, health, etc.—the greater
her unearned advantages—the greater her responsibility
to help alleviate avoidable DT. In particular, because
scientists/physicians have received increased, unequal,
partially unearned, societal advantages, as compared to
many other people, they have increased responsibilities
to “give back,” to help promote equal opportunity/pro-
tection from harm, as virtually all professional-ethics codes
recognize, e.g., [37]. Scientists’/physicians’ increased advan-
tages include government-funded education, research
grants, societal protection/licensing for professional careers,
and “corners on the market” providing scientific/medical
services. These increased advantages arise because of scien-
tists’/physicians’ largely-unearned higher intelligence and
resulting higher incomes. Granted, most scientists/physi-
cians have worked hard, but without largely-unearned
advantages like high intelligence, good parenting, and edu-
cational opportunities, their privileges would have been un-
achievable. Given such privileges, scientists/physicians and
others with such increased advantages have greater respon-
sibilities (than most people) to protect society from harm,
especially in areas related to their expertise [35]. To
the degree that citizens, including scientists/physicians,
do not accept any heightened responsibility—which
varies, individual to individual, on the basis of unearned
advantages like intelligence, education, etc.—their in-
action helps cause avoidable DT, for which they
are responsible.
Fourth argument: DT benefits create DT duties
Citizens, and especially wealthier citizens like scientists/
physicians, also bear justice-based responsibilities to help
stop DT because, according to the DT-benefits argument,
even if epigenetic change is not heritable—all citizens, and
scientists/physicians in particular, have justice-based duties
to take action on avoidable DT because they benefit from
it. How do they benefit? Just as many people have
saved money by purchasing sweatshop-produced
goods, and just as wealthier people likely purchase
more sweatshop goods and therefore have greater re-
sponsibility for the harms they cause, something
similar holds for DT harms. To see how all citizens,
especially wealthier citizens such as scientists/physicians
benefit from DT, consider three examples: fossil-fueledautomobiles and electricity, pesticide-laden food, and
waste incinerators.
DT harms despite fossil-fuel benefits
At least in Europe and the US, fossil-fueled vehicles
cause DT risks because they are responsible for roughly
half of all ozone and particulates, neither of which has a
safe dose, both of which are especially harmful to chil-
dren [38,39]. Although asthma is a complex disease with
multi-factorial, multi-level origins, particulates alone
cause at least $2 billion annually in environmentally-
attributable asthma harms to US children, apart from
possible developmental decrements. Particulates are at
least part of the reason that US pediatric-asthma rates
have doubled in the last 10 years [39]. Yet, drivers of
fossil-fueled vehicles never compensate their child vic-
tims for harms they cause.
Something similar holds for recipients of fossil-fuel-
generated electricity. Although coal-fired plants produce
roughly 45 percent of US, and 41 percent of global, elec-
tricity——and are the largest US source of SO2/mercury/
air toxins and major NOX/ozone/particulates sources—
virtually all citizens benefit unfairly from this pollution.
Why? Coal-generated-electricity users impose develop-
mental risks from pollutants such as mercury, yet they
never compensate victims, like US newborns who suffer
$9 billion/year in IQ and discounted-lifetime-earnings
(DLE) losses from coal-plant-mercury pollution [40]. In-
stead, fossil-fueled vehicles and electricity plants impose
many of their health/economic costs—unpaid by users—
on society’s most vulnerable members, children.
Scientists’/physicians’ greater fossil-fuel benefits generate
greater DT duties
Even worse, uncompensated economic benefits that
wealthier people—like scientists/physicians—receive
from fossil-fueled vehicles and electricity may dwarf
benefits to others and explain the greater responsibilities
of wealthier people to address DT. Why? Scientists/phy-
sicians tend to have higher incomes, and those in the
highest-income decile appear to cause about 25 times
more fossil-fuel pollutants than those in the lowest-
income decile [41]. If so, wealthier people like scientists/
physicians may (unintentionally) be responsible for dis-
proportionate injustice from uncompensated DT harms,
such as asthma.
In his classic UK-government report, British econo-
mist Nicholas Stern [42] estimated that each person in
the developed world causes an average of 11 tons/year
of carbon-equivalent emissions—roughly $ 935/year in
fossil-fuel, climate-only (droughts, floods) effects that
kill about 150,000 people/year. Yet global annual out-
door-air-pollution-related deaths, mostly from fossil
fuels, are about 1.3 million/year—roughly 10 times
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person in the developed world causes about $900/year
climate-related deaths/harms, and if pollution-related
fossil-fuel deaths are up to 10 times greater, then
developed-world citizen could cause up to (10 x $900)
or $9,000/year in fossil-pollution deaths/harms. If so,
wealthier people—like physicians/scientists—each might
cause up to (25 x $9000) or $225,000 /year in fossil-
fuel-pollution damages, including DT [41], mainly to
poor people and children, for which they never com-
pensate anyone.
Greater pesticide and incineration benefits generate
greater duties to stop DT
Besides DT caused by fossil-fueled electricity and vehicles,
pesticides are widely acknowledged neuro-developmental
toxins that constitute a third example of how most people
profit unfairly from DT because they buy non-organic
food. Although pesticides save consumers money, they im-
pose inequitable DT harms on infants/children, especially
farmworker children. Moreover, pesticide-related income
losses, alone, are substantial—perhaps $61 billion/year, just
from organophosphate-pesticide-induced IQ and DLE
losses in children aged 0–5. Once organochlorines and car-
bamates are included, pesticides harms may rise higher.
Why? Data show that for a population of 25.5 million chil-
dren, aged 0–5, organophosphate pesticides cause losses of
about 3,400,000 IQ points/year [44]. Yet the monetary
value (DLE) of a one-point IQ loss is about $18,000—if
one takes the average of a US EPA estimate of about
$11,240 [45]; a Harvard estimate of about $16,500 [46]; a
US Centers for Disease Control estimate of about $20,000
[47]; and a Mount Sinai School of Medicine estimate of
about $22,300 [40]. Thus $18,000 x 3,400,000= about $61
billion/year DLE losses caused by organophosphate-
exposed young children—if one counts only the 50-
percent-highest-exposed children. (This $61 billion/year
loss may be an underestimate, given the substantial frac-
tion of overall IQ losses that may be contributed by chil-
dren with exposures at the lower end of the distribution,
and given the relative ubiquity of organophosphate expo-
sures). Although adult food consumers—including scien-
tists/physicians—partly benefit from these losses, they
never compensate victims. Yet fairness dictates that consu-
mers pay full costs for their activities/goods, not impose
them on innocent children [34].
Incinerator emissions, like lead, constitute another
example of how many citizens (unintentionally) gain
economic and health benefits from imposing DT risks
on children. At least some DT occurs because most citi-
zens (who create garbage) fail to cover full waste-
management costs/controls. Because most consumers
pay only small household-garbage-pickup fees, the
waste is often incinerated in poor neighborhoods—where lead and other emissions impose uncompensated
IQ and DLE losses on residents, especially poor/minority
children [48].
By benefitting from fossil fuels, pesticide-laden foods,
and waste incineration, most citizens are at least partial,
unintentional “free riders” who save money and health
by imposing their DT risks on poor children [34]. More-
over, because their unfair fossil-fuel, pesticide, incinerator,
and other DT-related benefits typically are proportional to
their consumption and thus wealth, higher-income
groups—like physicians/scientists—achieve greater un-
deserved gains, and thus bear greater responsibility, for
DT-associated harms.
All major objections fail
In response to previous arguments showing that all citi-
zens—and especially scientists/physicians, because of
their greater abilities, training, wealth, etc.—have justice-
based duties to help avoid DT, at least 7 questions/
objections may arise. These might be called the avoid-
ability, intention, neutrality, economics, excuse, uncer-
tainty, and unfairness objections.
The avoidability objection
The avoidability question is “how is it possible to deter-
mine which DT agents are avoidable?”. This question
can be answered only on a case-by-case basis, depending
on whether some DT agent is irreplaceable for human
needs, e.g., medicines. Moreover, this question’s answer
depends in part on the state of science/engineering—in-
cluding what is known about various chemicals, their DT
potential, and possible alternatives to them—and on the
ethical theory employed. For instance, all other things
being equal, Rawlsian egalitarians would be more likely
than Millian utilitarians to say some DT exposure was
avoidable, if a much more expensive alternative (to the
DT chemical) were available. Why? Rawlsians (more
than Millians) require protecting vulnerable minorities,
and take less account of the economic costs of protec-
tion. Thus, there is no algorithm to answer the avoid-
ability question. As noted earlier, the main (Kantian)
point is that “ought implies can.” Therefore, if one can-
not avoid some DT exposure, one is not obligated to
do so. However, whether an exposure is avoidable
requires case-specific, science-specific, ethics-specific
assessment.
The intention objection
What about the intention objection: If I don’t intend to
cause harm, how can I be responsible for DT? This ob-
jection fails because, as Aristotle [19] noted, people are
responsible when their intended acts, culpable
ignorance, or inaction causes harm. Why? People are re-
sponsible for what should know and who they allow
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Hitler (just as we might ask why people have failed to
stop avoidable DT, when many people at the time denied
Hitler’s atrocities, just as many today deny DT harms),
Karl Jaspers [49] and Jean-Paul Sartre [50] charged hu-
mankind with “metaphysical guilt.” For what? For not
creating themselves, through their attitudes/choices/acts,
as the sorts of people who would be help avoid societal
harms. To the degree that people’s own inaction/insensi-
tivity has allowed them to become passive, compassion-
less, or weak—to live in “bad faith”—they are culpable
for inaction in the face of great harms, whether Hitler or
DT. Hence, to varying degrees (proportional to individ-
ual ability, training, profession, income, etc., as argued),
everyone has duties to help prevent avoidable DT [49].The neutrality objection
Scientists/physicians, however, might have a neutrality,
objection. If scientists are supposed to be neutral, value-
free, and objective, how can they become activists
against DT?
The neutrality objection fails on several logical
grounds. First, it relies on the false assumption that
objectivity is neutrality; it is not. Objectivity is even-
handedness, lack of bias. Otherwise, scientists would
have to remain neutral about whether the earth is flat,
whether evolution is a fact, or whether anthropogenic
climate change exists. Second, if scientists remained
neutral, instead of speaking out against DT, they also
would err through inconsistency. Why? No good scien-
tists are neutral about poor science. Instead, they use
rational debate to help resolve scientific controversies.
If so, consistency demands scientists’ using rational de-
bate to assess possible advocacy in areas related to
their scientific expertise. Besides, even in doing sci-
ence, scientists are forced to make hundreds of value-
laden, methodological judgments, about everything
from proper sample sizes, measurement errors, and
possible model biases, to data interpretations [34]. If
they did not make methodological value judgments,
they could not do science.
Scientists/physicians also must make ethical value
judgments—for instance, about allowing avoidable DT—
or they violate principles of virtually all codes of profes-
sional (scientific) ethics. These codes bind scientists to
be unbiased/objective and to promote human welfare/
protection. Thus, the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science (AAAS) emphasizes the “added
responsibility of members of the scientific community,
individually and through their formal organizations, to
speak out” whenever public health or safety is at risk
[34,36,37,51]. Besides, if physicians/scientists do not
speak out and instead remain neutral, they cannot fulfilltheir duties of citizenship, duties to help ensure others’
equal protection. Yet no one ought avoid the duties of
citizenship. Physicians/scientists therefore do not cease
being citizens, just because they are scientists. Indeed, as
argued earlier, virtually all ethics codes agree that physi-
cians/scientists’ heightened abilities/training/education
arguably give them increased (not reduced) duties as
citizens [36,37]. Besides, if physicians/scientists did not
have duties to speak out, especially in areas related to
their special expertise, worse harms could occur. As
Burke put it: All that is necessary for the triumph of evil
is that good people do nothing.
Scientists’/physicians’ neutrality on important issues,
like DT, also would generate harmful consequences for
science itself. Why? The AAAS notes that roughly 75%
of US science is funded by industry, 25% by government;
that more than half of US-government-funded science is
military; and that for every $100 that environmental-
health industries spend on their science, government
spends about $1 [52]. Consequently, the medical-
scientific “playing field” is not level, but often politicized.
Declining government science/education funding, and
increased special-interest funding, further tilt this play-
ing field, as illustrated by fossil-fuel-industry-funded
“science” challenging anthropogenic climate change. The
result? Half of Americans believe scientists disagree
about whether anthropogenic climate change exists; yet,
at least since 1993, no climate scientists publishing in
basic-research journals have challenged climate change
[53]. Such special-interest “science” helps explains why,
even in top medical journals, pharmaceutical-industry-
funded studies rarely attribute harmful effects to their
drugs, while independent researchers often do so [54],
and why chemical-industry-funded studies rarely attribute
health damage to their pollutants, while independent
researchers often do so [27,55]. Private-interest-science
influence also helps explain why university scientists,
like Herbert Needleman, were harassed by the lead/gas
industry, why the smelting industry harassed Mary
Amdur, why the fossil-fuel industry harassed Mike
Mann, why the asbestos industry harassed Irving Selik-
off, why the beryllium industry harassed Adam Finkel,
etc. [34].
Special-interest science also explains why at least 50
percent of environmental epidemiologists—mostly in
universities—report polluter harassment after publishing
environmental-health research [28]. Given such tilted
scientific playing fields, unbiased physicians/scientists
who remain neutral serve the status quo, not objectivity.
Neutrality allows biased conclusions to become more
dominant, science and scientists to be harmed. Because
even-handed inquiry (not neutrality) serves objectivity,
unbiased scientists need not fear they lack objectivity, if
they take action on DT. The opposite is probably true.
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What about a third, or economics, objection. Would
preventing avoidable DT cause economic harm? The ob-
vious response is “for whom?” Polluters or innocent
children?
The main ethical/logical problem with the economics
objection is its begging the questions whether those who
seriously harm health should be out of business, whether
they have the rights to profit from causing harm. Making
this objection is thus a bit like an accused murderer’s
claiming (correctly, as already noted) that prosecuting
him is not cost-effective. Yet the key issue is justice, not
cost. After all, no reasonable person asks whether enfor-
cing basic human rights is economical.
The economics objection also errs factually. As already
noted, many scientists have shown that costs of prevent-
ing serious health harms——such as DT—are likely less
than those caused by allowing them. For instance,
French researchers examined economic benefits of lead-
abatement/prevention. They discovered lead abatement/
prevention costs were far less than health/social costs of
addressing lead exposure through screening, special-
education expenditures, crime, suffering, and reduced
DLE. Although France’s population is one-fifth that of
the US, lead-induced IQ losses cause French children’s
DLE losses of about 22 Euros/year or $30 billion/year,
and French crime losses of 62 Euros/year or $81 billion/
year [56]. Similarly, the health, IQ, DLE, etc. losses of
US children’s mercury exposures are up to $8 billion/
year [46]. More generally, US costs of environmentally-
attributable (caused) children’s lead exposure, asthma,
cancer, and neurobehavioral problems are up to $55 bil-
lion/year [40]. If lead-pollution costs are analogous to
those for other developmental toxins, every $1, spent on
lead (or other toxin) controls, causes $17-221 in benefits
[57]. If so, the economics objection may have little scien-
tific/factual merit.
The excuse objection
But suppose scientists/physicians have a fourth, or ex-
cuse, objection. Do people who do many good things
with their lives—raising children, healing patients, serv-
ing the poor, doing important research—have rights not
to spend time taking action on DT?
While reasonable, the excuse objection errs in ignor-
ing the fact, already argued, that people who cause
DT and benefit from it thereby have justice-based du-
ties to compensate for this injustice. Hence they can-
not rationally claim excuses for not taking action, any
more than robbers can claim ethical excuses for not
compensating their victims. Why not? Justice viola-
tions require justice-based restitution [58]. Because
taking action on DT is a matter of justice, not charity,
it is not optional. If not, scientists/physicians—ascitizens—have justice-based duties of democratic re-
sponsibility, especially if their failure to be politically
active in their areas of expertise contributes to DT. Of
course, different people’s duties to help address DT
differ, depending on their income, health, abilities, etc.
Nevertheless, no excuses completely exonerate offen-
ders from justice-based duties to rectify injustice.
Otherwise, justice would not exist. Also, it is unrea-
sonable, practically speaking, to offer excuses for com-
pletely relinquishing justice-based duties to take action.
If such excuses applied to all duties, they would gener-
ate question-begging, self-fulfilling prophecies that
caused great harm [34].The uncertainty objection
Still other thinkers might make a fifth, or uncertainty,
objection. How can physicians/scientists take action on
DT when the science remains uncertain?
Although reasonable people can disagree about
degrees of scientific uncertainty concerning DT, the
uncertainty objection is invalid because it commits a
logical fallacy, the appeal to ignorance. That is, it
assumes that because something has not been proved
harmful, it is harmless—that absence of evidence (e.g., for
DT) is evidence of the absence (of DT). This objection
also relies on at least three faulty assumptions. One is
that doing nothing is the way to remain neutral/object-
ive in science—a false claim, already rejected, in re-
sponse to the neutrality argument. Another erroneous
assumption is that the best evidentiary rule is to con-
sider a known toxin innocent of health harm until
proved guilty. However, this assumption has been
widely challenged, partly through the precautionary
principle, because waiting for certainty about a toxin’s
harm could cause massive death/disease. Conse-
quently, to protect public health, arguably society
should use a “preponderance of evidence rule,” not a
“beyond a-reasonable-doubt rule” to assess DT and
possible action to prevent harm [27,28]. That is, the
objection’s third flawed presupposition is that the best
health-science default rule, given scientific uncertainty,
is the pure-science rule to minimize false positives.
However, many physicians/scientists have shown that
because welfare-affecting science must prevent serious
harm/injustice, its default rule should be to minimize
false negatives. After all, given uncertainty about fire/
flood, one does not do nothing, but buys insurance.
Given uncertainty about rain, one carries an umbrella.
One gets medical check ups, balances her checkbook,
exercises, visits the auto mechanic—despite uncer-
tainty about harm. Analogous precautionary require-
ments also hold for uncertainty about more serious
threats, like DT [34].
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Even if scientists/physicians admit the importance of
taking action, they may have a sixth, or unfairness objec-
tion. Is it fair for those——who already have overwhelm-
ing research/healing/teaching duties—to have special
duties to tackle DT?
Contrary to the unfairness objection, scientists/physicians
have such special duties, as argued earlier, because of
their special abilities, unearned advantages, greater
wealth/consumption, etc. They also have knowledge
that few others have and, as Bacon put it, knowledge is
power. Those with more power have more responsibil-
ity. However, those who make the unfairness argument
disagree, likely because of their false assumptions. One
false assumption underlying the unfairness objection is
that scientists/physicians have “earned” their privileges,
hence should have no enhanced duties because of them.
However, as already argued, scientists/physicians are
not fully “self made.” Because their high IQs (thus better
income/education/training/research funding, etc.) are
partly unearned/undeserved, matters of chance—they
have no right to full benefits from them. If not, as pro-
fessional codes of ethics point out, scientists have spe-
cial duties to “give back” to society [7,51], as through
tackling DT. But if people ought not profit more than
others, from largely unearned/undeserved benefits like
high IQs, then fairness dictates scientists/physicians
have greater duties to take action than many other
people. Noblesse oblige. As the scientific research soci-
ety, Sigma Xi, said: “Because the pathways that we pur-
sue as research scientists are infinite and unfrequented,
we cannot police them as we protect our streets and
personal property. We depend on those other trave-
lers. . .along such lonely byways of knowledge” to pro-
tect us [51].
Another false assumption often made in the unfairness
argument is that, if others are doing little to tackle DT,
fairness dictates that I also have little/no responsibility.
However, while one’s duties to help avoid societal harm
may decrease if others fail to do their fair share, obvi-
ously others’ behavior does not dictate ethics. Murder
does not become morally acceptable, just because many
people murder. To assume others’ action/inaction justi-
fies one’s own action/inaction is to commit the logical
fallacy of appeal to the people. Instead, only logic/facts/
principles determine what is justified. After all, centuries
of racism/sexism have not make them right.
Scientists/physicians can take action
Citizens/physicians/scientists, however, have no duties to
help protect others, in their areas of expertise, unless
they are able to do so. “Ought implies can,” as Kant
[58,59] put it. How can scientists/physicians take action
on DT?At the group level, organizations like the Society of
Toxicology or the American Public Health Association
could issue recommendations for DT research/regulatory
action. After all, a decade ago, the American Geophysical
Union and the American Meteorological Society said we
have “collective responsibility” to take action on climate
change because we caused it [60]. An analogous claim
holds for DT, as already argued.
Working with nongovernmental health/environmental
organizations, both local and national—like the
Environmental Working Group, or Physicians for Social
Responsibility, both of which address children’s health—
physicians/scientists also can volunteer their time/
expertise. The benefit of such group (and especially local)
volunteering is that together, professionals can accomplish
what no one, acting alone, could achieve. Recently, for ex-
ample, the author and other university scientists failed to
convince government not to permit a dangerous coal-
gasification facility in our already-heavily-polluted area.
However, once we gave our information to local doctors,
the entire local medical association, hundreds of physi-
cians, voted against the facility. Government was forced to
do the same.
Individual physician/scientist action also is useful, such
as writing popular essays/blogs on important health
topics, whenever they publish analogous professional-
journal articles. By “translating” their research for lay-
people, scientists/physicians can help promote action on
DT. They also can list themselves as media-friendly
experts—through their universities, employers, and pro-
fessional associations—so TV/radio/newspaper/internet
reporters easily can contact/interview them. They can
serve pro-bono, on local/state/federal advisory boards,
such as that for the county health association, the local
Sierra Club, or for national groups such as the US EPA’s
Science Advisory Board, or committees/boards of the
US National Academy of Sciences (NAS). They can give
pro-bono testimony in DT court cases. To promote con-
sumer outreach/education on DT, they can speak at
school-parent-teacher-association meetings, publish local
op-eds, and advise citizens’ groups. School-parent-
teacher outlets are especially important because, regard-
less of people’s politics, as parents they usually are
deeply concerned about their children, hence likely to
help take action on DT. Moreover, the effort needed for
DT action is not great. If historians are correct, only
about 14 percent of the early colonists supported the US
revolution against England, partly because revolutions
are not good for banks and businesses. Imagine the DT-
awareness revolution that could occur if 14 percent of
parents were mobilized.
At the university or medical-school level, scientists/
physicians can encourage administrators, staff, and stu-
dent organizations to work on phasing out pesticide-
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facilities. Scientists/physicians in education can encour-
age students to do real-world environmental science/
health projects, either for course credit or instead of
exams. They can teach courses/parts of courses in which
students learn to respond to draft health/safety regula-
tions, environmental-impact assessments, and risk
assessments——thousands of which are released annu-
ally by the US government. In an annual biology course,
the author’s students typically receive up to four benefits
from their pro-bono projects, responding to draft scien-
tific/government/regulatory analyses. First, students
often obtain publications from their work. Second, the
victims/impacted communities receive free scientific as-
sistance that helps protect and empowers them, al-
though they cannot pay for help. Third, attorneys often
can use this pro-bono student work to assist poor/
minority communities harmed by pollution. Fourth, and
most important, students who do this scientific work be-
come “vaccinated by social justice,” inspired. Once they
realize they can make a difference, they often dedicate at
least part of their lives to such pro-bono work, “liberation
science,” that helps protect vulnerable people [34].Policy suggestions
In the policy arena, how might society take action on
DT? One option would be banning all chemicals thought
to be developmental toxins until they are proved reason-
ably safe. However, this strategy appears impractical.
Funders of special-interest science probably would block
such bans by using tactics like lengthy court challenges.
After all, they have blocked most testing/regulation
under the 1976 US Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA). Despite massive growth in chemical produc-
tion/use, since 1976, TSCA has required testing of only
about 200—and has regulated only 5—of roughly 80,000
industrial-agricultural chemicals. Such failures suggest a
more moderate strategy is needed.
Another option would be for government to request
NAS to study DT and make regulatory/policy recom-
mendations. Like the classic 1993 NAS report on pesti-
cides in the diets of infants and children—which
triggered passage of the 1996 US Food Quality Protec-
tion Act—a DT study might be the catalyst for protective
legislation. The academy could assess DT triggers, cri-
teria, and health consequences. It also could suggest de-
fault environmental-health recommendations, until the
relevant science is clear—addressing product labeling,
temporary exposure-limit safety factors/limits, DT re-
search, testing, compliance assessment, etc. Although
admittedly NAS reports take time, whereas taking action
is urgent, relying on NAS expertise seems the best long-
term strategy, given its credibility.Conclusion
While important, deferring to NAS is not sufficient for
taking action on DT. Individual citizens/scientists/physi-
cians also must help. To motivate such help, this com-
mentary has offered four main arguments. These focus
on citizen duties to act, based on ethical theory, political
theory, citizens’ causing DT, and citizens’ benefitting
from it. Because of their special abilities/training/wealth/
etc., scientists/professionals have heightened responsibil-
ities, as both citizens and professionals, to protect
against DT. After all, professionals have many unearned
IQ/genetic/upbringing/income privileges from “the nat-
ural lottery of life” that have given them unintended but
unfair advantages over others [31]. To help compensate
for these unearned advantages, physicians/scientists can
help level the scientific playing field and take action on
DT. As Ghandhi put it, “Whenever I live in a situation
where others are in need. . .whether or not I am respon-
sible for it, I have become a thief” [61]. Like the Brazilian
child, DT-threatened children are in need. We are partly
culpable. We can be the light that helps banish the dark-
ness around them.
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